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1. Introduction 
It might be natural to expect private institutions to deliver better educational outcomes for 
students who can afford to attend them. In standard economic models, innate or early-life 
resources are complementary to human capital in the production of life outcomes, and a larger 
human capital investment is optimal for better-endowed individuals. Since relatively bright 
individuals are willing to pay for more privately provided human capital than the uniform 
amount chosen by the political majority for state schools (Stiglitz 1974), expensive private 
schools can then coexist with cheaper publicly funded ones. Equilibrium sorting is broadly 
similar if the quality of students itself drives schooling choices and outcomes, in that 
individual human capital accumulation is positively influenced by peer effects (Epple and 
Romano, 2004): when schools populated by better students are more attractive, private 
schools’ tuition and admission policies imply that they should educate the more talented 
segment of the student population. If perfect financial markets could ensure that only talent 
shapes the distribution of educational investments, then private schools should deliver better 
educational outcomes, as their students are better and can exploit more educational resources 
as well as favourable peer effects. In reality, borrowing constraints and other financial market 
imperfections imply that private schooling choices are also shaped by wealth heterogeneity, 
and may have undesirable socio-economic implications (see OECD 2012b). Unless wealth 
and talent are negatively correlated, the larger educational investments or better peer quality 
that complement richer students’ talent still imply that they should do better than government 
school students (De Fraja 2002).  
Private schooling may of course be attractive for reasons other than human capital 
accumulation, such as an exclusive social climate, or provision of extended hours, better 
amenities, individual tutoring and counselling, or religious education. Empirically, country-
specific studies find that private education is associated with better future performance in 
terms of college attendance and labour market prospects in the United States (Evans and 
Schwab 1995, Rouse 1998, Figlio and Stone 2001) and in the United Kingdom (Green et al. 
2011), but private schooling is associated with poorer outcomes in Italy (Bertola and Checchi 
2004, Bertola, Checchi and Oppedisano 2007) and Ireland (Pfeffermann and Landsman 
2011), while in Chile government and private schools are differently effective for students 
from different family backgrounds (Contreras, Sepulveda and Busto 2010). Vandenberghe 
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and Robin’s (2004) cross-country analysis of the 2000 PISA survey finds that private 
education is associated with higher competencies in some countries, but with lower 
competencies in others.  
In this paper, we relate heterogeneous test performances to the qualitatively different role 
played various countries by private educational establishments. Like the overall size of the 
private education sector (West and Woessmann, 2010), its configuration is rooted in each 
country’s historical experience. Not only the amount of resources, but also the organization 
and objectives of educational processes are qualitatively different in private and government 
schools.1 Private schools cater to students who not only can better afford to pay higher fees, 
but also find that government schools are less suitable for them. Brunello and Rocco (2008) 
suggest that students who cannot meet the standards of state school may in some countries 
choose to pay to obtain degrees and certifications from less demanding private education. 
Private schools more generally differ from government schools not only because they charge 
tuition fees, but also because they supply education (and not just degrees) that differs along 
dimensions that influence the characteristics of the students they attract or select.  
Across countries, differences in the relevant features of government and private schools can 
lead to positive or negative talent sorting, and account for cross-country test performance 
differences. In countries where historically determined organizational features of government 
schools provide only basic egalitarian education, and do not reward students’ talent, then the 
private sector attracts better students and displays better achievements (as in United States, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom, as well as in Brazil and Uruguay). In countries where 
government schools instead cater to stronger students, the private sector attracts lower quality 
students (as it is the case of Italy, Israel or Indonesia). Since the student pool of the private 
sector is then worse than that of government schools, it is not surprising to find empirically 
that private school students’ performance on standardized tests is in these countries worse 
than that of government school students. 
To detect empirically such “product differentiation” across educational establishments, we 
exploit information about school-level teaching techniques in the PISA international survey 
data to assess whether educations is organized in ways that complement or substitute student 
talent in the production of educational outcomes. To characterize the determinants of different 
                                                           
1
 Since in British English “public” refers to elite schools that are typically privately funded we use “government” 
to refer to schools that are publicly funded and/or organized. 
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choices and outcomes in different countries, we focus on cross-country differentials between 
government and private schools in terms of features that are more or less suitable for students 
with heterogeneous learning ability, and we seek evidence of our theoretical perspective’s 
empirical realism in regressions where such features are interacted with indicators of 
individuals’ ability to learn and to choose private schooling.  
2. Modelling private school choice 
We consider school choice by individuals who are heterogeneous both in terms of their 
“educability” (i.e. ability to take advantage of quality schooling, “talent” for short) and their 
ability to pay or, more generally, to choose privately managed schools (“wealth”).  
We let the outcome of individual i ’s attendance of school j  depend positively on individual 
talent iθ  according to  
 ijjij bay θ+= ,       (1) 
where ijy  may denote expected earnings, employability, general competences, or other 
forward-looking individual objectives; the intercept, ja , measures school j ’s absolute effect, 
irrespective of individual characteristics; and the slope, jb , is an indicator of how strongly 
educational outcomes depend on individual characteristics, hence of the complementarity 
between the school’s educational techniques and its students’ talent. These parameters may 
differ across educational establishments along a variety of dimensions such as selectivity in 
admission, curriculum, evaluation criteria, disciplinary climate, educational philosophy, 
religion or ideology. To characterize the choice between government and private schooling, 
we let not only the outcome as in (1) but also the cost of school attendance depend on whether 
1=j  indexes a private school or 0=j  a government school. Formally, we suppose that the 
cost for individual i  of choosing school j  is  
( ) jiij fzc −= 1 ,                                                 (2) 
where 01 ff >  if private schools are more expensive. Financial market imperfections imply 
that the relevance of these costs depends on an index, denoted iz , of individual i ’s resources. 
As discussed in the introduction, privately run schools do not necessarily absorb larger 
resources, but always differ from government schools in their ability to adjust qualitative 
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aspects of education. The functional form in (2) can capture such a mechanism if 
01 ff ≠ represents the extent to which private education management is allowed to 
differentiate its educational offering from that of government schools, and iz  indexes the 
extent to which a specific individual is able to take advantage of such heterogeneity (for 
example, because private schools are readily available nearby). 
Aiming to maximize ijij cy − , individual i  chooses the private 1=j  school instead of the 
government 0=j  school if  
 ( ) ( ) 000111 11 fzbafzba iiii −−θ+>−−θ+ . (3) 
Rearranging this condition to  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 001010101 >−−−+−+θ− ffaazffbb ii  (4) 
we see that if 01 bb > , i.e. private schooling is better suited to education of brighter 
individuals as in Epple and Romano (1998) or in De Fraja (2002), then individuals with 
higher talent iθ  and higher resources iz  are sorted into private schooling.  
If instead less expensive government schools reward talent more strongly ( 01 bb < ), then the 
higher cost 01 ff >  of private schooling can be justified by higher talent-independent payoffs 
01 aa >  for students who have sufficiently low talent iθ  and sufficiently large financial 
resources iz  (or, more generally, who are better able to choose privately organized schools if 
it is advantageous for them to do so). When 01 bb < , therefore, students who enrol in private 
schools have lower talent: their performance may therefore be worse even when larger 
resources expended in their education, and especially likely to be lower when private schools 
are no more expensive than government schools but exploit their autonomy so as to be 
especially well suited to low-talent individuals. 
In this simple choice model, all school features that influence learning outcomes are 
summarized by the parameters of the choice criteria. Private schools are attended by richer 
students if they are more expensive, but need not attract better students if government schools 
cater to high-talent students. We will study below how empirical indicators of school and 
student heterogeneity contribute to shaping the talent pool selected into government and 
private schools. As we do so, we will need to keep in mind that the model does not explicitly 
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account for other potentially relevant determinants of government/private choices, such as the 
availability of religious education, luxurious facilities, and more general features that need not 
directly bear on educational outcomes, but may vary along both individual and cross-country 
dimensions.  
The model’s parameters, and the empirical indicators considered below, can instead represent 
well the organizational features that play a more relevant role in determining educational 
outcomes (Woessmann 2003, Hanushek, Link and Woessmann 2011), as well as the peer 
effects emphasized by Epple and Romano (1998) and Epple, Figlio and Romano (2004): 
while evidence from the US suggests that private schools differentiate themselves from 
government schools that are not selective and use a teaching approach suitable for low-talent 
students, elsewhere government school may provide education suitable for high-talent 
students, as in the academic track of Continental European systems, and favourable peer 
effects.  
School funding could also be quantitatively different across government and private schools 
to a different extent in different countries, but there is little or no evidence of relationships 
between the level of spending and students’ achievement at primary and secondary school 
levels (Hanushek, 1986). A potentially more relevant shortcoming of the model’s simple 
structure is the fact that its ex-ante perspective neglects issues of effort choice and asymmetric 
information on talent. MacLeod and Urquiola (2009) have shown that if schools select 
students, and talent is revealed by entrance exams, then students admitted to selective 
institutions have lower incentives to accumulate skills. This may provide an alternative 
explanation for worse performance of students admitted in selective private colleges at least 
in developing countries like India (Rubinstein and Sekhri 2008), or in situations like that of 
Chile where, after introduction of vouchers in 1981, up to 55% of students were attending a 
private institution, without any effect on average competencies (Contreras, Sepulveda and 
Busto 2010).  
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
The mechanisms we focus on are certainly also at work inside each country, both across 
vocational and academic tracks, and across more or less expensive and demanding schools. 
Empirical analysis of international data cannot exploit the rich information that is sometimes 
available to country-specific studies of the extent to which sorting of students across more or 
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less selective and resource-rich post-secondary institutions may explain their different 
educational and labour market performance. Even suggestive evidence from a more general 
setting can be preferable to precise estimation in very specific circumstances, however, and 
the international dimension is a source of observable variation in predetermined country-
specific educational system features.  
We consider empirical indicators of government vs. private schooling differences across the 
countries and regions covered by the 2009 Program for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) survey, documented in OECD (2012a). This survey, repeated every three years, 
provides an internationally comparable assessment of reading, math and science competences 
of 15 year old students. It also gathers from students, parents, and school heads a wealth of 
additional information regarding students’ individual characteristics, family backgrounds, and 
schools' resources endowment and educational practices.  
PISA 2009 data are available for 72 countries or sub-national units. The data set, while very 
detailed, is not ideal for our purpose of assessing the empirical relevance of qualitative self-
sorting effects on average school performance. In the simple model of Section 2, private 
schooling may be more expensive for its users than government schooling, and its educational 
offer may be more or less strongly complementary to student talent. Two survey questions to 
school heads collect relevant information. 
First, we know whether the school is autonomous from central government because it is 
managed by non-government organizations or other private institutions. Table 1 reports the 
numbers of students surveyed in government and private schools, identifying the latter as 
those that are managed independently from the government, regardless of whether they also 
receive most of their funding from non-government sources. In total, there are observations 
from 18029 schools and 476980 student records, some of which will have to be dropped 
because of missing values for variables we include in our specifications.2 As defined, private 
schools enrol approximately 20 percent of the student population on average. They attract less 
than 10 percent of students in United Kingdom, United States, Germany, and more than 30 
percent in Chile, Indonesia, Spain, Ireland and Netherlands. As in the OECD (2012b) study of 
socio-economic stratification across government and private school systems, this definition is 
                                                           
2
 The complete PISA 2009 file contains 515858 student records from 18641 schools. We drop all observations 
from France and Moldova, where no information is available regarding whether schools are public or private, 
and  23 060 observations of students who are 15 year old but are attending grades that differ from the modal 
grade by more than one year. 
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appropriate for the purpose of detecting differences rooted in private schools’ ability to 
manage resources flexibly, whether in order to offer more efficient and cost-effective 
services, or in order to cater to specific student body characteristics.  
Second, we know how much of the school’s funding originates from the government, from 
student fees, or from benefactors. Fewer schools are classified as “private” on the basis of 
whether they receive most of their funding from non-government sources. While this 
alternative definition should in principle be more restrictive, in the data the two definitions 
overlap: a non-negligible number of government-controlled schools are funded by fees to a 
larger extent than private schools in the same countries, presumably because of geographical 
or field heterogeneity. For our purposes, the definition of “private” in terms of managerial 
autonomy well suited to capture the extent to which private schools may cater to differently 
talented students, even when the costs are the same, and makes it possible to exploit 
international variation across a larger number of countries (essentially all privately managed 
schools are fully funded by the government in Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, 
Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Slovak Republic, Serbia, 
Slovenia, and Sweden).  
The results reported in the rest of the paper use management as the criterion for the 
government vs. private classification, and include tuition fee information to control for 
funding variation.3 Since the geographical location of schools is not recorded, and not all 
school are surveyed, it is not possible to assess how costs and other school features influence 
private school enrolment within each individual’s choice set.4 Like OECD (2012b), therefore, 
we exploit the variation observed in the characteristics of private and government school at 
the level of the countries (or, in a limited number of cases, sub-national regions) where the 
survey was administered. We use the school-level information on the budget portions drawn 
from private and government sources to construct a country- and school-type specific 
indicator of user costs,  
(F) Fees: the percentage of school funding from fees or charges paid by parents. 
                                                           
3
 The parental portion of the survey, administered in very few countries, gathers often missing information about 
the direct cost of schooling for country specific income brackets (variable pa12q01). While that cost is higher in 
each country for reporting households with students in private schools, it is not comparable across countries. 
4
 As in e.g.  Martínez-Mora (2006), who finds that low-quality private schools exist in US localities where low 
property tax revenues support only low-quality public schools. 
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The exact definition of this variable is provided in the legend of Figure 1, which plots against 
it country-specific average differences between private and government schools of the 
mathematics, literacy, and science PISA test scores (each normalized on a common scale with 
a procedure documented in OECD 2012a). If the best students were selected into a private 
sector that supplies better albeit more expensive education, PISA scores differentials should 
all be positive, and more so where Fees differentials are large. In the data, the relationship 
between the available indicators is rather flat and noisy. And while private school PISA 
scores are higher in most countries, notably in Anglo-Saxon countries (United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) where private education is widely thought to 
provide better education, in about a fifth of the countries government schools have better 
PISA test scores than private schools.  
If differently able students are sorted into government and private education, of course, it is 
not necessarily appropriate to interpret test scores as a measure of school performance. The 
PISA test measures each student’s “ability to apply the knowledge and skills learned at school 
to real-life challenges” at age 15: like the outcome ijy  in equation (1), the test score combines 
individual characteristics (that might be innate or result from previous life experiences) with 
school-specific features that, in most countries, have operated only for one or two years by the 
time the test is taken. Much of the test score differential across government and private 
schools may indeed be driven by the different ability of their students, rather than by the 
effects the small amount of heterogeneous education already experienced at test time.  
The PISA data offers some direct information on the determinants of enrolment choices. In 
the 2009 survey we analyze, parents in some countries were asked to indicate reasons they 
chose the school their children were attending. In many of the 15 countries where such data 
are available, safety and pleasantness of the environment are the most typical reasons for 
choosing private schools. Academic standards or reputation (and not only geographical 
proximity, ideology, special programs, and past attendance by other family members) appear 
relevant only in New Zealand, Hungary, and Qatar.5 While these data confirm that self-sorting 
of students into private schools is not always motivated by better academic quality, they are 
very scarce and noisy: the parental survey was carried out in only one Anglo-Saxon country 
                                                           
5
 In Pisa 2003 a similar question was asked to the students themselves in all countries. In Italy, Austria, and 
Japan “special programs” were the more prominent answers; in Canada, Germany and UK, “better quality 
education” was mentioned most often. 
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(New Zealand), and self-declared motivations may not truthfully reveal that remedial features 
were the reason for the family’s choice of private schooling.  
For our purpose of identifying structural determinants of student sorting into private 
schooling, we prefer to focus on the information provided by the PISA survey on schools' 
educational techniques. A large amount of school-level information is available on many 
organizational aspects that appear well suited to education of high-ability individuals, or to 
strengthening the educational outcomes of less talented students. We proceed to consider 
some potentially useful such indicators (full definitions can be found in the legends of Figures 
2a-f): 
(R1) Selectivity, a gauge of the role of previous academic performance in school admission.  
(R2) Accountability, in terms of the availability of comparative information on the school’s 
performance.  
(R3) Low Pressure to perform, an index of weak concerns about academic standards on the 
part of parents. 
(R4) Repeaters, the fraction of students repeating a year in the school.  
(R5) Good Discipline, an index of infrequent absences and other disruptive behaviour.  
(R6) Autonomy, a measure of the extent to which the school chooses its own curriculum and 
educational techniques. 
Across countries, the average among private schools of each school feature is significantly 
and positively correlated with the average of the same feature among government schools.6 
This unsurprisingly indicates that country-specific features (such as the prevalence of 
vocational education, the characteristics of the tax system, and culture) determine the overall 
characteristics of each country’s educational system. The differences in such characteristics 
across private and government schools, however, offer interesting indications of whether, in 
each country’s specific situation, students for whom government-provided education is less 
than perfectly suitable, and who are in a position to choose private education instead, are 
seeking opportunities to express their talent (because government schools cater to low-ability 
students) or remedial education (when government education is demanding). 
                                                           
6
 The cross-country correlation between public and government average Fees is the least significant, at about 
2%. All other correlations, whether estimated linearly or in rank terms, have p-values below 0.1%. 
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To assess the potential relevance of indicators R1-6 to such product differentiation 
mechanisms, we compute their country-level mean difference across private and government 
schools. In Figures 2a-f, as in Figure 1, we plot the resulting observations to offer descriptive 
information, and inspect their bivariate relationship to similarly constructed differences of 
PISA test scores. In Figure 2a Selectivity differences are positively associated with the 
differential of PISA performance across private and government schools.  This is not 
surprising, in that enrolment in a selective school is an indication of otherwise unobservable 
good prior academic performance; however, schools do not need to be selective when their 
teaching techniques imply that only talented students apply, hence it will be interesting to see 
whether this positive association survives in the next section’s multivariate regressions. 
School Accountability differences may be a better indicator of talent-complementary school 
features; in Figure 2b, their bivariate relationship with PISA test score differences is perfectly 
flat and imprecise. A strong and negative relationship is instead observed in Figure 2c with 
Low Pressure differences, a very direct indicator of the extent to which schools are expected 
(by parents) to demand and deliver good educational outcomes. In Figure 2d we see that PISA 
scores tend to be worse in school segments where Repeaters are more numerous: larger 
numbers of repeating students could indicate that the students are worse performers, or that 
they are evaluated more severely; the bivariate relationship displayed in the figure suggests 
that the former mechanism prevails in the data. Good Discipline indicators need not be related 
to academic performance in theory, because they may be attractive features independently of 
whether they foster learning. In practice, we see in Figure 2e that they are strongly and 
positively related to PISA test performances, indicating that parents want talented children to 
study in non-disruptive environments, or that discipline indirectly measures teaching features 
that attracts students who are harder to control as well as to teach. There is also little reason to 
expect Autonomy, which allow schools to adopt more or less demanding curricula, to be 
positively or negatively related to academic performance; in fact, Figure 2f displays a shallow 
and noisy relationship with test scores. 
Our formal empirical work will focus on the difference between such relevant observable 
features of each country’s private and government schools, and especially on the interaction 
of that difference with individual characteristics, controlling for country fixed effects. To 
assess the multivariate empirical relevance of these indicators of internationally 
heterogeneous private vs. government differences in terms of teaching techniques, student 
selection, and user costs, we proceed to inspect their coefficients’ statistical significance and 
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sign in regressions aimed at describing how heterogeneous students are sorted into private 
education.  
4. Regression specification 
The simple model outlined in Section 2 could in principle be estimated on individual data if 
exogenous determinants of school choice as in (1) were observable, and could be used to 
model selection effects as in (4). The educational outcome ijy  that drives individual choices, 
however, is realized much later in life than the age at which PISA data are collected. The 
dataset does include detailed information about students’ background, but no obvious 
empirical counterpart of the theoretical model’s exogenous iθ  “talent” is available: previous 
schooling performance or IQ test scores are not recorded in the PISA survey and, even if they 
were available, they would not necessarily measure cleanly the exogenous and largely 
unobservable heterogeneity in each individual’s ability to take advantage of challenging 
education, or need for remedial help. This makes those data poorly unsuitable to model 
selection, as illustrated by the very mixed results of Vandenberghe and Robin’s (2004) efforts 
to use individual background variables as instruments in estimating the effects of private 
schooling on PISA test performance.    
In what follows, we use the admittedly imprecise country-level information discussed in 
Section 3 to try and disentangle the interplay of individual and school features in determining 
observed private school enrolment choices. As an empirical counterpart of the choice criterion 
(4), we consider the linear (for simplicity) probability model 
 iccicici fazfbp ε+∆−∆+∆+θ∆=  (5) 
where 1=ip  if individual i  is observed attending a private school in country c , 0=ip  if 
individual i  is attending a government school instead. An empirical counterpart of the 
theoretically relevant differences 01 bbbc −=∆  and 01 fffc −=∆  can be constructed (as we 
will do shortly) from the country-level indicators discussed in Section 3 above, which can be 
viewed as predetermined with respect to individual choices within each country. To estimate 
(5), empirical counterparts are also needed for each individual’s “ability to learn” iθ  and 
“ability to choose private” iz : these conceptually distinct dimensions of individual 
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heterogeneity are not directly observable, and any implementation of equation (5) needs to 
approximate them with variables that need not be independent of the error term iε .  
To address this issue we suppose that, like the life outcome modelled in equation (1), the 
observed test performance may depend on both country- and individual-specific factors as 
well as on intrinsic unobservable talent, we suppose that the latter is linked to the PISA score 
by a relationship in the form  
∑
=
β+β+α=θ
J
j
jicjicci XPISA
1
.                            (6)  
This very general notation allows individual characteristics indexed by j to shape the 
inference that one may draw on iθ  from the test outcomes in ways that may depend on the 
country c where they are observed. Crucially, it assumes that, within each country, neither the 
slope nor the level of this relationship depend on whether student i is enrolled in a 
government or in a private school. Otherwise, in the absence of exogenous observable 
determinants of enrolment choices it would not be possible to disentangle the obvious 
circularity of possible effects, and assess whether talent influences school choice or the 
chosen school influences performance.  
Our maintained identifying assumption is that most if not all of the variation in PISA scores 
unaccounted for by covariates reflects factors that also determine school choice, rather than 
the effects of the school where students are enrolled. This perspective on the data is certainly 
very different from that of studies viewing the PISA score as an outcome of interest when 
assessing school effectiveness (Vandenberghe and Robin, 2004). While not testable, it 
appears at least as plausible as other identification strategies, not only because the school has 
been operating for only one or two years at the time when the survey is administered, but also 
because it presumably was not chosen for the purpose of doing well on that test: any direct 
influence of the school on the PISA score, for example through an educational climate that 
motivates students to do well on anonymous tests, should not matter for the choice we are 
modelling as much as its the longer-run, and unobserved, influence on life outcomes.  
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Next, we specify a similarly flexible relationship between each individual’s ability to pay (or 
to choose a privately managed school) and a list of observable individual characteristics:7 
∑
=
δ+γ=
J
j
jicjci Xz
1
                       (7)  
Inserting (6) and (7) in (5) we obtain 
( ) ( ) icccccJ
j
ijccjccjiccci fabXfbPISAbp ε+∆−γ+∆+α∆+∆δ+∆β+β∆= ∑
=
1
1
       (8)  
and we proceed to discuss how a regression of this type may help assess the role of 
international school-system heterogeneity in determining private school enrolment.  
To this end, we specify an empirical counterpart for country-level differences in talent-related 
schooling features in the form of a weighted linear combination of the country-level 
indicators introduced in Section 3 and defined and displayed in Figures 2a-f, 
 ∑
=
∆λ=∆
6
1k
kckc Rb ,                                                            (9)  
and we similarly suppose that the theoretical cost differential is related as in 
 cc Ff ∆µ=∆      (10)  
to the fees indicator introduced in Section 3 and documented in Figure 1. The slopes of these 
relationships can be estimated from cross-country data if cross-country parameter 
heterogeneity is suitably restricted. Inserting (9) and (10) in (8) yields an equation that relates 
observed private school enrolment choices to interactions between the individual PISA score 
and country-specific differences of schooling features that are more or less attractive for more 
or less talented students. If as in (9) each schooling feature k  influences the theoretical talent-
complementarity parameter b  in the same way across countries (i.e., kλ  is not allowed to 
vary with c ), an individual’s better ability to learn as indicated by higher PISA scores should 
be more strongly associated with private school enrolment within countries where private 
schools appear more suitable for good students than government schools.  
In the data, this is the case when xcR∆  is strongly positive for schooling features for which 
0>λx  is theoretically plausible, or very negative for features that are more suitable for weak 
                                                           
7
 By construction, (6) and (7) allow the two choice-relevant characteristics of each individual to be correlated 
through observables that appear in both expressions with non-zero coefficients. Correlation through 
unobservables would of course be problematic. 
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students, so that 0<λx . Since this implication is drawn from a specification that does not 
allow the relationship between PISA score and unobserved ability to differ across government 
and private schools within each country, estimates of these effects are of course biased by any 
choice-and-PISA-relevant effect that the chosen school already had at the time of PISA 
testing. 
Besides interactions between PISA scores and country-level schooling features, estimable 
regressions in the form (8) should include fixed country effects. These can hardly be omitted, 
in light of the very wide differences in such factors as the average cost of private education 
and the intensity of any religious connotation or contextual effects, and absorb the 
( ) ccccc fab ∆−γ+∆+α∆ 1  term in (8), hence the main effects of all country-specific private-
government difference indicators. Estimable counterparts of (8) should also in principle 
include all individual level covariates ijX  that may be expected to be related to each student’s 
ability to learn (and to do well on the standardized tests), and/or to the family’s ability to enrol 
him or her in a private school. In the most general models of this type, the slope parameters 
ccj
k
kckcjcjccj FRfb ∆µδ+∆λβ=∆δ+∆β ∑
=
6
1
 
of any potentially relevant covariate j  should be allowed to differ across countries in 
unrestricted ways, and would absorb all the slope variation theoretically implied by country-
level schooling features and fees differences. It would be inappropriate to restrict the 
coefficients of any individual observable characteristic jiX  to be the same across countries: 
not only because the parameters linking those characteristics to the choice-relevant variables 
iθ  and iz  may be heterogeneous across countries (a concern that may be partly alleviated by 
the fact that many observables can be expressed in the form of OECD-normalized indexes); 
but also because our theoretical perspective implies that those underlying variables have 
different implications for private school choice in different countries. 
Restricting not only kλ  but also µ  to be the same across countries may make it possible to 
isolate the average influence of school-system features on enrolment choice through their 
interaction with individual variables. The coefficients of interactions between school-system 
features and individual observable characteristics, however, generally estimate a mix of the 
sorting effects of interest, and of those characteristic’s relevance to the underlying abilities to 
learn and to choose private education. Additional identifying assumptions are needed to 
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isolate and interpret some country-specific sources of slope heterogeneity.  To see this, 
suppose covariate xj =  could be excluded from the ability-to-learn relationship (6), where 
0=βcx  for all c . This would make it possible to detect that variable’s influence on ability to 
pay as in (7), at least on a cross-country average basis, and to infer from the interaction 
coefficient of xiX  and cF∆ the role of individual ability to pay in determining private school 
choices. Symmetrically, excluding some other covariate from any relevance to ability to pay 
would make it possible to assess the ability-to-learn relevance of specific schooling features 
from their interaction with that covariate.  
5. Regression results 
We proceed to explore the empirical fit of our perspective in cross-country pooled individual 
choice regressions that, as in (8), (9), (10), model the internationally heterogeneous relevance 
of talent and ability to pay in private school choice as a linear combination of the country-
specific differences between private and government schools discussed in Section 3. School-
level variables need not appear in the specification, not only because they are excluded by our 
identifying assumption but also because including the characteristics of the school attended by 
each student would be a source of omitted variable bias when no information is available, at 
levels of disaggregation lower than that of countries, for the schools that were feasible but 
rejected alternative choices in each student’s choice set. Nevertheless, we report statistics 
allowing for clustering at the school as well as the country level. Coefficient estimates turn 
out to appear more precisely estimated when standard errors are only clustered at the country 
level, so this is a conservative assumption, and may usefully capture second-moment effects 
of each school’s unobserved geographical and socio-economic situation.  
The PISA survey collects a large number of individual-level variables, very many if not all of 
which are potentially related to the family’s ability to choose private schooling, to the 
student’s ability to learn, and to other factors that influence enrolment choices. Of course, 
estimation of specifications in the form of (8), (9), (10) needs to parsimoniously focus on a 
few such variables of particular interest, because a large number of interacted covariates 
would not only make estimation too onerous when all available countries are included in the 
sample, but also yield results that would be very difficult to interpret clearly.  
To illustrate our approach and assess its empirical relevance, we consider individual-level 
variation in five theoretically relevant characteristics as well as in the PISA score: 
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(X1) Individual Gender (female = 1), which can influence private school choices not only 
through any relationship to ability-to-learn but also through country-specific cultural and 
schooling system features (such as different concerns about disciplinary and behavioural 
environments, or the coeducational character of government schools).  
(X2)  Individual enrolment in a Vocational or pre-vocational programme, coded as 1 when 
PISA variable iscedo takes values 2 or 3 (rather than 1=General education), which can 
similarly play a role in the determination, within each country, of private school choice by 
students of different ability. 
(X3)  City size, as a scalar indicator (rather than a set of dummies, to ease estimation and 
interpretation of interaction coefficients) corresponding to the possible answers to survey 
question sc04q01.8 This is a proxy of availability of private schools, which should make them 
easier to choose for individuals who find them more suitable than government schools.  
Among the many background characteristics that may be relevant to each student’s talent as 
well as to the family’s ability choose non-government independently managed schools, we 
use: 
(X4) Cultural level, the standardized “Family cultural possessions” index reported in variable 
cultposs (based on answers given to questions on availability of “Classical literature”, “Books 
of poetry”, “Works of art.”) 
 (X5) Wealth, the standardized “Family wealth possessions” index reported in variable wealth 
(based on answers given to questions on availability of “A room of your own”, “A link to the 
internet”, “A dishwasher”, “A DVD player”, “How many cellular phones”, “How many 
televisions”, “How many computers”, “How many cars”, “How many rooms with a bath or 
shower” and three country-specific items).  
Of course, these and others observable household characteristics are all correlated to both the 
student’s ability to learn, iθ  as in (6), and the family’s ability to pay, iz  as in (7). However, 
                                                           
8
  “Which of the following definitions best describes the community in which your school is located? 1= A 
village, hamlet or rural area (fewer than 3000 people); 2=A small town (3000 to about 15000 people); 3= A town 
(15000 to about 100000 people); 4=A city (100000 to about 1000000 people); 5=A large city (with over 
1000000 people).” 
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the two we choose are arguably more cleanly related to those theoretical factors than the other 
available OECD-standardized indices of family background.9 
The most general versions of regressions that control for even just these individual variables 
in country-specific fashion require estimation of several hundred unrestricted nuisance 
parameters. For this reason, in Table 2 we initially report simpler regressions, aiming to 
assess the extent to which the interaction effects of interest we detect there (as well as in the 
bivariate relationships displayed in the figures above) remain sensibly signed and significant 
in more complex and rigorous specifications. 
The regression reported in column (1) of Table 2 models the relationship between private 
enrolment and individual PISA scores,10 allowing its slope to vary across countries in ways 
explained by interactions with private/government differences of country-level averages of 
teaching feature indicators. A main effect of the PISA score and country specific intercepts 
are also included in the regression. Some strongly significant and sensibly signed interaction 
coefficients convey a message that is broadly similar to, but interestingly different from that 
of the bivariate relationships displayed in Figures 2a-f. Selectivity is not significant, 
indicating that schools which offer talent-complementary teaching features do not need to 
reject poor performers. Accountability, Good Discipline, and Autonomy interaction 
coefficients are significantly positive, indicating that these features are complementary to the 
PISA score talent indicator; Low Pressure and Repeaters interaction coefficients are 
significantly negative instead. 
The regression reported in column (2) allows the PISA score and the five iX  variables listed 
above to also enter individual-level regressions with country-specific slopes. This 
theoretically sensible specification considerably weakens the relationship between private 
school choices and interactions with PISA scores of country-level indicators of private vs. 
                                                           
9
 The “Home educational resources” index (hedres, based on answers given to questions on availability of “A 
desk to study at”, “A quiet place to study”, “A computer you can use for school work”, “Educational software”, 
“Books to help with school work”, “technical reference books”, “A dictionary”) is related to both financial and 
cultural resources, and availability of specifically educational resources may be determined by the child’s need 
for help, rather than be a determinant of ability to learn.  The “ICT resources at home” index (ictres, based on 
availability of “Educational software”, “A link to the internet”, and “How many computers”) may also reflect the 
need for remedial help, or be polluted for the purpose of assessing the family’s cultural level by use of internet 
and computers for entertainment rather than learning purposes. 
10
 Measured as the simple average of the science, reading, mathematics test results, each transformed to the 
PISA scale with a “plausible values” imputation methodology on each of these domains and for sub-domains in 
science (see OECD 2012a for details). 
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government school differences. The coefficient of the Repeaters interaction is now 
insignificantly negative, suggesting that large numbers of held-back students may indicate 
that the school demands good performance from students; Good discipline, another relatively 
dubious indicator of talent-complementary school features, is completely insignificant. Low 
Pressure and Autonomy remain significant, indicating that some theoretically sensible 
variables do account for a portion of the country-specific variation in the PISA slope as an 
explanatory variable for private school enrolment.11 
In column (3), like in column (1), the regression omits country-level covariates in unrestricted 
form (and controls only for country-specific intercepts and a pooled PISA score main effect) 
in order to focus on some potentially interesting interactions between country-specific school 
features and observable individual characteristics other than the PISA score. In this 
admittedly loose specification, indicators of both Cultural Level and Wealth report 
significantly positive interactions with Fees, and significantly negative interactions with Low 
Pressure. The positive interaction between Wealth and Fees suggests that ability to pay plays 
an important role in determining choice of privately managed schools, and the negative 
interaction between Cultural Level and Low Pressure (a school feature that is most clearly not 
complementary to student talent) suggests that, depending on the configuration of each 
country’s school system, that choice need not be positively related to ability to learn. The 
positive interaction between Cultural Level and Fees, and the negative one between Wealth 
and Low Pressure, confirm that it is not easy to use observable background characteristics (all 
of which are correlated to each other and to the underlying theoretically relevant factors) to 
disentangle ability to pay from ability to learn.  
In column (4), in fact, inclusion of individual covariates with country-specific slopes suffices 
to invert the sign of two of the estimated interactions. In this specification, interactions 
between some country-specific features and individual covariates absorb part of the variation 
that was already explained by country-specific slope coefficients in column (2), and do not 
affect the estimated coefficients of PISA score interactions. In countries where private schools 
                                                           
11
 It may be helpful to note that these coefficients are identified by the assumption that  the λ  parameters in (9) 
are not country-specific, and that the information they convey is the same that could be gathered from the 
coefficients of a regression of PISA slope coefficients, estimated from country-specific controlled regressions, 
on the country-specific indicators. Such a two-step approach would require adjustment of coefficient standard 
errors to account for estimation errors in the dependent variables and, while perhaps more immediately 
interpretable, it is computationally no less demanding than the one-step estimates we report. 
 
 20
are relatively less demanding, as indicated for example by Low Pressure in this specification, 
good PISA test performers are less likely to choose them. The sign pattern of the Wealth 
interaction coefficients is consistent with our theoretical perspective, and their significance 
confirms the empirical relevance of its sensible implications. Privately managed schooling is 
chosen by rich families (to an extent determined by country-specific cost differentials), but 
not necessarily (and even less when they are more expensive) for students who, on the basis 
of their family’s cultural level, appear better able to cope with a demanding learning 
environment.  
This specification arguably implements our theoretical perspective as rigorously as practically 
possible, and considerably stresses the information content of the data: fewer parameters can 
be estimated than in column (2), because many interacted variables are dropped due to 
collinearity. In principle, many other theoretically interesting mechanisms could be detected 
empirically; in practice, this is far from easy. To try and  detect the possible role of City Size 
in allowing private schools to be chosen, the regression reported in column (5) interacts that 
variable with the country-specific indicator of Autonomy, but the slope parameter (like the 
variable itself) is very poorly measured and, while sensibly positive, it is insignificant. 
6. Summary and directions for further research 
We argue in theory that private schools’ teaching techniques need not always be 
complementary to students’ ability to learn, so that better students select into private 
education: when high ability students are well served by government schools, private schools 
may cater to worse students. Our empirical analysis generalizes and interprets the contrast 
between country-specific evidence of positive selection into private schooling in the US (as in 
Epple, Figlio, and Romano 2004) and negative selection in Italy (as in Bertola, Checchi, and 
Oppedisano 2007). Along the cross-country dimension of the PISA 2009 survey data set, we 
find that private schools attract more talented students where they are more demanding and 
less talented students where they specialize in relatively remedial education in the presence of 
high-quality government school. In terms of features that can be approximately measured on 
the basis of the information available in the PISA survey, private schools appear better suited 
to good students in countries like Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, where 
private schools deliver better test performances. In countries such as Italy and Indonesia, 
conversely, private schools are less attractive for good students than government schools.  
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Further research could fruitfully explore in more detail the empirical patterns uncovered by 
the regressions we report, which are only meant to be illustrative. Analysis of sub-samples of 
countries may uncover more interpretable information, and could be refined recognizing that 
the characteristics of private and government schools differ, within countries, across segments 
defined by city sizes and vocational orientation. While peer effects are difficult to measure 
reliably, their plausible relevance reinforces the mechanism we focus on since, at any given 
level of resource expenditure, the relative quality of private and government schools’ student 
bodies should be directly related to that of their educational offering.  
It would also be interesting to characterize the historical and political determinants of 
whether, in each country, the teaching organization of government schools caters to low or 
high ability students, leaving different market niches to be filled by private schools. The 
distributional implications of such heterogeneity are of course important, and interact with 
those of voucher schemes and other policies meant to make private education affordable for 
poorer families. If liquidity constraints keep poor and talented youth from attending better 
private schools, then such schemes improve equality of opportunities at the same time as they 
enhance the productivity of society’s educational resources. In countries where high-quality 
government schools attract the brightest segment of the student pool, conversely, government 
funding of privately organized education benefits a segment of low-ability students who are 
not rich or disadvantaged enough to purchase unsubsidized remedial education. While the 
resulting redistribution across differently wealthy and differently able individuals may be 
politically attractive in some cases, voucher schemes do not enhance equality of opportunities 
and the overall efficiency of education systems where governments provide low-cost 
demanding education. 
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Figure 1. PISA Scores and Fees, country-specific differences between private and 
government school averages. Vertical axis: difference between the average across all of each 
country’s private school students, and the average across all government school students of 
PISA scores in mathematics, reading, and science. Horizontal axis: User cost differentials 
measured from country-specific averages, within each of the private and government sectors, 
of variable sc03q02, the school manager’s answer to survey question “About what percentage 
of your total funding for a typical school year comes from school fees or school charges paid 
by parents?” 
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Figure 2a. PISA Scores and Selectivity, country-specific differences between private and 
government school averages. All observations are plotted along with a linear regression 
prediction and 95% mean confidence intervals. Vertical axis: PISA Scores differential as 
defined in the note to Figure 1. Horizontal axis: Selectivity differential measured from 
country-specific averages, within each of the private and government sectors, of variable 
selsch coded to have value 1 for schools where neither students’ academic record (including 
placement tests) and the recommendation of feeder schools are considered for student 
admittance, 2 for schools considering at least one of these indicators, 3 for schools where at 
least one of these two factors is a prerequisite for student admittance. 
  
 26
 
Figure 2b. PISA Scores and Accountability, country-specific differences between private 
and government school averages. All observations are plotted along with a linear regression 
prediction and 95% mean confidence intervals. Vertical axis: PISA Scores differential as 
defined in the note to Figure 1. Horizontal axis: Accountability differential measured from 
country-specific averages, within each of the private and government sectors, of variable 
sc21q03, coded 1 if the school provides information to parents on the academic performance 
of students as a group relative to students in the same grade in other school.  
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Figure 2c. PISA Scores and Low Pressure, country-specific differences between private 
and government school averages. All observations are plotted along with a linear regression 
prediction and 95% mean confidence intervals. Vertical axis: test scores differential as 
defined in the note to Figure 1. Horizontal axis: Difference between country-specific 
averages, within each of the private and government sectors, of variable sc18q01, with values 
1 if the school head reports that “there is constant pressure from many parents, who expect 
our school to set very high academic standards and to have our students achieve them”, 2 if 
“pressure on the school to achieve higher academic standards among students comes from a 
minority of parents”, 3 if “pressure from parents on the school to achieve higher academic 
standards among students is largely absent.” 
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Figure 2d. PISA Scores and Repeaters, country-specific differences between private and 
government school averages. All observations are plotted along with a linear regression 
prediction and 95% mean confidence intervals. Vertical axis: test scores differential as 
defined in the note to Figure 1. Horizontal axis: Repeaters differential measured from 
country-specific averages, within each of the private and government sectors, of variable 
sc07q02 reporting “the approximate percentage of students repeating a grade at ISCED 3 in 
this school last year”. Missing information for Iceland, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Norway, 
Poland (only private) is set equal to zero.  
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Figure 2e. PISA Scores and Good Discipline, country-specific differences between 
private and government school averages. All observations are plotted along with a linear 
regression prediction and 95% mean confidence intervals. Vertical axis: test scores 
differential as defined in the note to Figure 1. Horizontal axis: Difference of country-specific 
averages, within each of the private and government sectors, of variable studbeha, a 
normalized index of school climate based on indicators of Student absenteeism; Disruption of 
classes by students; Students skipping classes; Students lacking respect for teachers; Student 
use of alcohol or illegal drugs; Students intimidating or bullying other students. Higher values 
code better behaviour; the variable is normalized by OECD to unitary standard deviation and 
ranges between -3.41 and +2.36.  
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Figure 2f. PISA Scores and Autonomy, country-specific differences between private and 
government school averages. All observations are plotted along with a linear regression 
prediction and 95% mean confidence intervals. Vertical axis: test scores differential as 
defined in the note to Figure 1. Horizontal axis: Autonomy differential measured from 
country-specific averages, within each of the private and government sectors, of variable 
respcurr, a normalized index of school responsibility for curriculum and assessment based on 
school head indications regarding “Establishing student assessment policies”, “Choosing 
which textbooks are used”, “Determining course content”, and “Deciding which courses are 
offered”. Higher values code higher levels of school responsibility in this area; the variable is 
normalized by OECD to unitary standard deviation and ranges between -1.36 and +1.36. 
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Country  
or sub-national unit 
 
% 
private 
 
Students 
 
Schools 
 
Albania 8.6 4570 181 
Azerbaijan 1.83 4643 162 
Argentina 36.64 3976 189 
Australia 38.83 14226 353 
Austria 13.64 6098 234 
Belgium 70.21 7866 255 
Brazil 12.28 17558 939 
Bulgaria 1.4 4433 178 
Canada 7.14 22960 974 
Chile 59.14 5015 164 
Shanghai (China) 10.05 4854 151 
Chinese Taipei 38.2 5824 158 
Colombia 19.76 6775 273 
Costa Rica 17.09 3476 178 
Croatia 1.42 4994 158 
Czech Republic 4.72 5725 261 
Denmark 17.89 5819 285 
Estonia 2.68 4664 175 
Finland 4.77 5771 193 
Georgia 5.21 4566 225 
Germany 5.37 4470 215 
Greece 6.69 4920 183 
Hong Kong 93.06 4366 151 
Hungary 11.86 4545 185 
Iceland 0.64 3305 131 
Indonesia 45.91 4812 181 
Ireland 63.26 3386 144 
Israel 17.44 5590 176 
Italy 5.44 30109 1 062 
Japan 27.46 6088 186 
Kazakhstan 2.6 5381 199 
Jordan 13.84 6408 210 
Korea 38.06 4987 157 
Kyrgyzstan 2.19 4938 173 
Latvia 0.84 4395 180 
Liechtenstein 5.52 326 12 
Lithuania 0.98 4477 196 
Luxembourg 14.48 4580 39 
 
 
Macao (China) 
 
 
97.08 
 
 
4415 
 
 
45 
Malaysia 4.17 4992 152 
Malta 41.84 3246 52 
Mauritius 46.11 4190 182 
Mexico 11.01 36007 1 530 
Montenegro 0.81 4825 52 
Netherlands 61.41 4553 185 
New Zealand 5.21 4641 163 
Norway 1.22 4578 197 
Panama 28.44 3281 188 
Peru 20.96 5291 237 
Poland 6.86 4882 185 
Portugal 11.36 5204 214 
Qatar 28.99 8012 151 
Romania 0.63 4776 159 
Russian Fed. 0.23 5217 213 
Serbia 1.01 5439 190 
Singapore 2.4 5081 171 
Slovak Republic 7.69 4411 188 
Slovenia 2.1 6154 341 
Spain 41.04 23130 886 
Sweden 11.88 4563 189 
Switzerland 3.17 11548 426 
Thailand 12.98 6181 230 
Trinidad Tobago 15.43 4025 149 
Dubai (UAE) 57.51 10114 369 
Tunisia 1.77 3900 164 
Turkey 0.7 4847 150 
United Kingdom 3.9 11545 482 
United States 6.58 5224 164 
Uruguay 20.83 4926 225 
Miranda (Venezuela)  90.23 2631 121 
Himachal Pradesh 
(India) 16.97 1355 66 
Tamil Nadu (India)  37.62 2900 147 
 
Total 
 
18.67 476980 18029 
 
Table 1. Sample distribution of students by school type and country. Schools surveyed in 
PISA 2009 are classified as private when variable schtype takes value 2 (“government 
dependent private schools,” controlled by a non-government organization or with a governing 
board not selected by a government agency, receiving more than 50% of their core funding 
from government agencies) or 3 (“government independent private schools,” controlled by a 
non-government organisation or with a governing board not selected by a government agency, 
receiving less than 50% of their core funding from government agencies). This information is 
not available for France and Moldova. Students not in the modal grade ± 1 year are also 
dropped from the sample.  
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Dependent variable: 1 if in Private school,  
                                  0 if in government school. 
 
   
Regressors: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Individual PISA Score 
interaction with country: 
     
   ∆ Selectivity 10-4    -0.4551     11.2170     35.5220     11.2170     11.2170  
              -0.72        0.71        1.52        0.71        0.71  
  ∆ Accountability 10-3     0.8453      1.8124      0.6447      1.8124      1.8124  
       9.12        1.75        0.51        1.75        1.75  
∆ Low Pressure 10-3    -0.5823     -2.7233     -2.4266     -2.7233     -2.7233  
              -9.03       -2.16       -1.60       -2.16       -2.16  
∆ Repeaters 10-3    -0.0949     -0.0836     -0.2210     -0.0836     -0.0836  
              -12.26       -1.45       -2.61       -1.45       -1.45  
∆ Good Discipline 10-3     0.2438     -0.0426     -1.2637     -0.0426     -0.0426  
            5.49       -0.04       -0.86       -0.04       -0.04  
∆ Autonomy 10-3     0.5115     -3.0126     -4.6040     -3.0126     -3.0126  
              8.79       -2.51       -2.66       -2.51       -2.51  
 
country ∆ Fees 10-4 
interaction with individual: 
   
 
 
  Cultural level       1.4215     -2.5416     -2.5416  
                      9.35       -1.62       -1.62  
Wealth       5.7573     14.6232     14.6232  
                      17.49        6.59        6.59  
 
country ∆ Low Pressure 10-3 
interaction with individual: 
  
                                    
Cultural level     -16.0734     93.7160     93.7160  
                     -8.15        2.33        2.33  
  Wealth     -14.8801   -178.1112   -178.1112  
                     -3.84       -3.46       -3.46  
 
country ∆ Autonomy 10-3 
interaction with individual: 
   
 
 
City size     500.7585 
                   0.91 
Controls (a) (b) (a) (b) (b) 
Observations     476980      466957      462193      461070      461070  
Parameters    78    473    145    465    465  
Residual SS   4.93e+04    4.16e+04    4.59e+04    4.10e+04    4.10e+04  
 
Table 2. Individual private school choice across countries. Coefficients from a linear probability 
model of interactions between individual covariates and the ∆ private-government country-
level average differences of the indicators defined in the legends of Figures 1 and 2a-f. For 
legibility the differences displayed in those figures are rescaled, by 10-3 or 10-4 as indicated, 
before running these regressions. Coefficient not reported for additional controls: (a) country 
fixed effects and pooled main effect of individual PISA score; (b) country fixed effects and 
country specific main effects of PISA Score and of Gender, Vocational, City size, Cultural 
level, Wealth (see the main text for definitions). The t statistics in italics allow for error 
clustering at the country and schoolid level. 
 
